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ANTITRUST LAW-AN ILLUSORY EXPANSION OF CONSUMER 
STANDING UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT-Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property 
by reason of anything forbidden in the antit~st laws may sue 
therefor in any district court. . . ."1 This section of the Clayton Act 
appears to grant a broad right of redress to those injured by viola­
tions of the antitrust laws. rhe courts have recognized, however, 
that although an antitrust violation injures many as it ripples 
through the economy, not all those who are injured have the right 
to seek redress. Consequently, the courts have used restrictive in­
terpretations of the words found in section 4 to limit the standing 
of those seeking the treble damage remedy. 
Before 1977, a consumer who paid an inflated price for a com­
modity because of the illegal actions of the manufacturer was able 
to seek redress under section 4: This remedy was available 
whether the consumer had purchased the commodity directly from 
the manufacturer or indirectly, through a retail outlet. This 
changed in 1977 when the United States Supreme Court decided 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 2 That case defined the word "injured" 
in section 4 by holding that only persons who purchased directly 
from the antitrust violator were injured within the meaning of sec­
tion 4. 3 Since most consumers make their purchases indirectly 
through intermediaries, the direct purchaser rule of Illinois Brick 
effectively bars consumer actions for the treble damage remedy. 
In 1979, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. ,4 the Supreme Court was 
faced with the question of whether a consumer, injured by paying 
more than she would have in the absence of antitrust violations, 
was injured within the meaning of the section 4 term "business or 
property."5 Ignoring the impact of the direct purchaser rule of Illi­
nois Brick, the Court held that such consumer injuries were within 
the protection of section 4 and granted standing. 6 This note will ex­
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as § 4 of the Clayton Act]. See 
also note 28 infra. 
2. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
3. [d. at 746. 
4. 442 U.S. 330 (1979). 
5. [d. at 338. 
6. [d. at 342. 
81 
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amine the conflict between Illinois Brick and Reiter, the congres­
sional intent regarding consumer standing under section 4, and the 
resulting practical significance of the Reiter holding. 
II. THE CASE 
On May 2, 1975, Kathleen Reiter sued Sonotone COrp.7 and 
four other manufacturing firms8 under section 4 of the Clayton 
Act. 9 Sonotone manufactured the hearing aid which Reiter pur­
chased from a dealer representative. 1o She alleged that Sonotone 
had violated the antitrust lawsll by controlling the price at which 
hearing aids could be sold to consumers.12 Reiter sought redress 
for the injury she incurred by paying a higher price for the hearing 
aid than she would have paid in the absence of any alleged anti­
trust violation. 13 The defendants moved for dismissal of Reiter's 
suit claiming she lacked standing. 14 
The issue raised by Sonotone's motion for dismissal was 
whether section 4 of the Clayton Act, which requires an injury to 
business or property,15 encompassed only injuries to commercial or 
business interests. 16 Sonotone argued that Reiter's injury, one suf­
fered by a consumer who had been forced to pay a higher price for 
goods purchased for personal use, was outside the protection of 
section 4 since it was not of a commercial nature. 17 
7. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933 (D. Minn. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 
1077 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 442 U.S. 330 (1979). Reiter sought to'rep­
resent the class of all persons who had purchased hearing aids manufactured by one 
of the five defendants. ld. at 934. 
8. The other four firms were Beltone Electronics Corporation, Dahlberg Elec­
tronics, Inc., Textron Incorporated, and Radioear Corporation. 
9. See note 28 infra and accompanying text. 
10. 435 F. Supp. at 934. 
11. Specifically, Reiter claimed the defendants had: 
restricted the territories, customers, and brands of hearing aids offered by 
their retail dealers, used the customer lists of their retail dealers for their 
own purposes, prohibited unauthorized retailers from dealing in or repairing 
their hearing aids, and conspired among themselves and with their retail 
dealers to fix the retail prices of the hearing aids. 
442 U.S. at 335 n.1. 
12. 435 F. Supp. at 934. 
13. ld. 
14. All defendants except Sonotone, who did not appear in any proceeding be­
fore the district court, moved for dismissal. Id. 
15. See note 28 infra and accompanying text. 
16. 435 F. Supp. at 935. 
17. ld. 
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Judge Larson of the United States District Court for Minne­
sota granted standing to Reiter.lS Judge Larson held that Reiter 
suffered injury to her business or property within the meaning of 
section 4. 19 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir­
cuit reversed the lower court's holding and denied standing. 20 The 
Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Burger writing for the majority, 
held that Reiter's injury, that of a consumer who had paid an ille­
gally higher price for goods purchased for personal use, was pro­
tected by section 4. 21 The Court then remanded the case to the 
district court for further proceedings. 22 
Reiter succeeded in bringing consumer interests within 
the business or property language of section 4 of the Clayton Act. 
During the appeal of the case, however, the Supreme Court 
decided Illinois Brick, which held that only a direct purchaser 
is injured within the meaning of section 4. 23 Reiter, an indirect 
purchaser since she bought her hearing aid from a retailer and 
not from the manufacturer,24 will be denied standing on remand 
under the Illinois Brick rule. Because of the apparent conflict 
between Illinois Brick and Reiter, resort must be made to the con­
gressional position on standing under section 4. This note will ex­
amine that position as well as explain its impact on the Reiter 
holding. 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. The Sherman and Clayton Acts 
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890 to prohibit monopo­
lies, attempts to monopolize, and all agreements in restraint oftrade. 25 
18. Id. at 938. 
19. Id. 
20. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d at 1087. 
21. 442 U.S. at 339. 
22. Id. at 345. 
23. 431 U.S. at 746. 
24. 435 F. Supp. at 934. 
25. The Sherman Act, ch. 647,26 Stat. 209 (1890), provided in part: 
SEC. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... , is hereby declared to be 
illegal. ... 
SEC. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
... , shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.... 
SEC. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
84 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:81 
In response to the merger movement of 1897-1904,26 and because 
the Sherman Act was ineffectual in reaching certain other anticom­
petitive forms of conduct,27 the Clayton Act was passed in 1914 to 
amend the Sherman Act. 28 
any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared 
to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor ... and shall recover three fold 
the damages.... 
26. A. AUSTIN, ANTITRUST: LAW, ECONOMICS, POLICY 3-4 (1976). 
27. The Sherman Act was ineffectual in reaching tying arrangements, exclusive 
dealings, price discrimination, and secret rebates. Lack of enforcement and prosecu­
tion as well as the unresponsiveness of the judicial system were also considered to 
be problems of the Sherman Act. [d. 
28. The Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified in scattered sections 
of 15, 29 U.S.C.). The purpose of the Act, as stated by its sponsors, was to "make un­
lawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and in themselves, are not cov­
ered by the [Sherman Act]...." S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). The 
Clayton Act provides in part: 
SEC. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce 
... to discriminate in price between different purchasers ... , where the ef­
fect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or 
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce [or to injure, destroy, or 
prevent competition with any person who. either grants or knowingly re­
ceives the benefit of such discrimination... ]. 
(Bracketed portion contains language added by the Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. 
No. 74-692, ch. 592,49 Stat. 1526 (1936)). 
SEC. 3. [I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... , 
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ... , or fix a price char­
ged therefor ... , on the condition ... that the lessee or purchaser thereof 
shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor ... of the lessor or 
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract ... may be to substan­
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com­
merce. 
Because § 7 of the Sherman Act limited the treble damage remedy to those injured 
by a violation of the Sherman Act alone, it was amended by the Clayton Act. The 
Clayton Act gives the remedy to those injured by any violation of the antitrust laws: 
SEC. 4. [A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property 
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any 
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant re­
sides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in contro­
versy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the 
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.... 
SEC. 7. That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire ... any 
part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation [and no corpo­
ration ... shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corpo­
ration ... where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to 
tend to create a monopoly]. 
(Bracketed portion contains language added by the Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. 
No. 74-692, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)). 
SEC. 8. [This section prohibits any person from being a director in two 
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The primary purpose of the Sherman Act and its amendments 
was to prevent restraints of trade which lessen free and full compe­
tition. 29 Congress recognized the benefits of a free market3° and 
intended only to regulate those acts which prevented the inde­
pendent operation of the marketplace. 31 In effectuating the legisla­
tive aim of protecting free and full competition, Congress 'chose 
or more corporations, anyone of which has a capital and surplus of more 
than one million dollars] if such corporations are or shall have been thereto­
fore, by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors.... 
29. The initial resolution adopted by the Senate, which started the legislative 
process, directed the Committee on Finance to inquire into and report: 
[S]uch measures as it may deem expedient to set aside, control, restrain 
or prohibit all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations 
between persons or corporations, made with a view, or which tend to pre­
vent free and full competition ... , with such penalties and provisions ... as 
will tend to preserve freedom of trade and production, the natural competi­
tion of increasing production, the lowering of prices by such competition.... 
19 CONGo REC. 6041 (1888). See generally M. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE 
CONSUMER (ENFORCEMENT) 32-170 (1956). 
30. D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 7-24 (1959). Economic 
analysis suggests that the benefits of a free market are decreased prices with in­
creased supply, increased technology and innovation, efficient production and distri­
bution, and efficient resource allocation. 
Competition also tends toward desired social goals. Because the private deci­
sions of individual buyers and sellers in the marketplace determine economic factors 
such as price, level of production, allocation of resources, distribution, and technol­
ogy, there is less need for governmental intervention. Since the free market dis­
perses private power, there is also less need for governmental regulation. To the ex­
tent that this lessens the impact of special interest groups on the legislative process, 
the democratic system is improved. 
31. The combinations prohibited by the Act were those: "made with a view to 
prevent competition," 21 CONGo REC. 2462 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman); which 
"control prices," id. at 2471 (remarks of Sen. Allison); made "to limit production" for 
"the purpose of destroying competition," id. at 2558 (remarks of Sen. Pugh); "that ef­
fect the price of commodities," id. at 2609 (remarks of Sen. Morgan), 
Senator Platt, a critic, commented that the Act proceeds on the assumption that 
"competition is beneficient to the country." [d. at 3147. 
See generally 21 CONGo REC. 2457-61 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman); id. at 
2729 (remarks of Sen. Platt); id. at 4089 (remarks of Rep. Culbertson). 
When the Act was attacked as too expansive, supporters explained that mergers 
which would enable the new enterprise to compete more effectively with larger en­
terprises would not be impeded. The merger of two small competitors in an industry 
characterized by large competitors would not be barred. 95 CONGo REC. 11,486, 
11,488, 11,506 (1949); 96 CONGo REC. 16,436 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 
1st Sess. 6-8 (1949); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950), The merger of 
one bankrupt firm with a financially healthy one would not be prohibited. 96 CONGo 
REC. 16,435, 16,444 (1950); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950); H.R. 
REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949). 
The agreement by Congress concerning this purpose of the Act was noted by the 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Standard Oil CO. V. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). 
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language32 which would allow enforcement of the law,33 deterrence 
of antitrust violations,34 and encouragement of suits by individuals. 35 
B. Standing 
In considering the scope of standing, reference first must be 
made to the United States Constitution. The Constitution limits 
the federal courts' jurisdiction to cases and controversies. 36 This 
language has been interpreted to require that the dispute be adju­
dicated in an adversarial context and in a form historically viewed 
as capable of judicial resolution. 37 To meet the first requirement, 
32. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (as amended by the Clayton 
Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)). See notes 25 & 28 supra and accompanying 
text. 
33. The House debates show such an intent. See generally 51 CONGo REC. 
16,274-75 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb); id. at 16,317-19 (remarks of Rep. Floyd). 
Senate debates reflected no discussion of the enforcement value of the treble dam­
age remedy. This was in spite of attacks on the Bill regarding its lack of meaningful 
sanctions. See, e.g., 51 CONGo REc. 15,818-21 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Reed); id. at 
16,042-46 (remarks of Sen. Norris). See also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. V. Interna­
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Lawlor v. National Screen Servo Corp., 
349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954). 
34. Treble damages of § 4 of the Clayton Act were provided in part for punitive 
purposes. 21 CONGo REc. 3147 (1914) (remarks of Sen. George). See also Fortner En­
terprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) (developer 
granted standing to sue for lost profits caused by construction of pre-fabricated 
homes which was a condition of financing provided by manufacturer's subsidiary); 
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (com­
mon law doctrine of in pari delicto held inapplicable as defense in suit by licensed 
operators against the corporation granting them the licenses for antitrust violations 
arising out of their agreement). 
35. The treble damages of § 4 of the Clayton Act were provided to offset "the 
difficulty of maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is described" in 
the Act. 21 CONGo REc. 2456 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Sherman). 
Debates accompanying § 7 of the Sherman Act, which first provided for the 
treble damage remedy, showed that the remedy was intended for "[tlhe people of 
the United States as individuals." 21 CONGo REc. 1767-68 (1890) (remarks of Sen. 
George). See also 21 CONGo REc. 2612 (1890) (remarks of Sens. Teller and Reagan); 
id. at 2615 (remarks of Sen. Coke). 
When amended by § 4 of the Clayton Act, debates showed that it was intended 
to "open the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who 
violate the antitrust laws, and give the injured party ample damages for the wrong 
suffered." 51 CONGo REc. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb). See, e.g., 51 CONGo 
REc. 9079 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Volstead); id. at 9270 (remarks of Rep. Carlin). See 
also Brunswick Corp. V. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977) (loss 
of anticipated earnings caused by acquisition of bankrupt competitor held not to be 
within protection of antitrust laws even though acquisition was a violation). 
36. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2. 
37. Association of Data Processing Servo Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150, 151-52 (1970) (association of data processors granted standing to seek judicial re­
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that there be an adversarial context, the parties must allege an ad­
verse interest in the cause of action or in the subject matter of the 
controversy.38 The interest alleged may not be remote or inciden­
tal. Such an interest may be aesthetic, recreational, or conserva­
tional, as well as economic. 39 
The second requirement, that the case be capable of judicial 
resolution, is met by alleging that the granting of relief will result 
in a benefit to the party bringing the action. 4o As with the interest 
alleged in the cause of action, the benefit to be gained from 
bringing the cause of action may be aesthetic, conservational, or 
recreational, as well as economic. 41 By examining the requirements 
of an interest in the cause of action and a benefit to be gained, the 
courts are able to allocate scarce judicial resources to cases worthy 
of adjudication. 
C. Standing and Section 4 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person injured 
in his business or property by reason of an antitrust violation may 
sue for treble damages. 42 The broad scope of section 4,43 however, 
may allow the litigation of negligible, highly speculative, and re­
mote claims. 44 Such claims may be brought by plaintiffs who al­
leged an injury in order to coerce settlement through a defendant's 
fear of the treble damage award allowed by the Clayton Act. This 
view of Comptroller of Currency's decision that national banks could provide data 
processing services). 
38. Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 395 (1915); Standard Stock Food Co. 
v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 550 (1912); Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108, 114 (1904). 
39. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 
1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (responsible representative of listening public granted standing 
as party in interest in hearing before FCC); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference 
v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965) (conservation group with interests in aes­
thetic, conservational, and recreational impact of FPC ruling granted standing to 
seek review). 
40. Falvey v. Foreman-State Nat'l Bank, 101 F.2d 409, 416 (7th Cir. 1939) 
(shareholders of bank denied standing to sue on behalf of bank which had assigned 
cause of action to another bank). 
41. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
42. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. 
43. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) (ex­
clusive selling agency created by coal producers to mitigate existing evils in industry 
and foster competition held not in derogation of antitrust laws although incidental ef­
fect on prices would result). 
44. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (shareholder of 
photographic supply house forced out of business by defendant's alleged illegal con­
duct held not to have standing since injury was to corporation). 
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concern has increased with development of multi-level distribution 
systems in business which are characterized by middlemen sep­
arating the manufacturers and ultimate consumers in the chain of 
distribution. The separation of the injured party from the antitrust 
violator aggravates the problem of proof of damages. 45 
To resolve these conflicts, the courts have used the standing 
doctrine to limit the suits capable of being brought under section 
4. By restrictive interpretations of the words found in section 
4, the courts have limited the interests protected by the statute 
and, consequently, the right to standing. This judicial activity has 
centered around the meaning of, and the interests protected by, 
the words "person," "injured," "business or property," and "by 
reason of. "46 
D. Standing for Indirect Purchasers 
Before 1977, the Supreme Court had not directly addressed 
the question of the standing of consumers who were indirect pur­
chasers, that is, persons who purchased goods from retailers in­
stead of directly from the alleged antitrust violator. In 1977 the 
Court decided Illinois Brick and held that only direct purchasers, 
and not others in the chain of distribution, were injured within the 
meaning of section 4.47 The case involved the State of Illinois, to­
gether with 700 governmental bodies, suing manufacturers of ce­
ment blocks for selling the blocks at higher prices due to an al­
leged price conspiracy.48 The cement blocks had been sold by the 
manufacturers to contractors who, after successfully bidding on 
construction projects, had incorporated the blocks into buildings 
which then had been sold to the plaintiffs. 49 Consequently, the 
plaintiffs were indirect purchasers, and the success of their cause of 
action depended on proving that the contractors had passed on to 
them the Illinois Brick Company's illegal overcharges. 
To properly understand the Illinois Brick ruling, consideration 
must first be given to Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machin­
ery Corp. 50 That case involved a section 4 action brought by a 
45. Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 332 
(1974). 
46. See Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section Four of the 
Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964). 
47. 431 U.S. at 746. 
48. Id. at 726. 
49. Id. 
50. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
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manufacturer of shoes to recover illegal overcharges from the man­
ufacturer of its shoe machinery. 51 In defense, the shoe machinery 
manufacturer sought to show that the plaintiff had not been injured 
in its business as required by section 4. The defendant claimed 
that the illegal overcharges had been passed on in the form of 
higher shoe prices to the plaintiff's customers.52 Under the defend­
ant's theory the illegal overcharge was absorbed by the plaintiff's 
customers, indirect purchasers of the defendant's shoe machinery, 
and that they were the actual injured party. 53 
The Court held that the direct purchaser alone, here the shoe 
manufacturer, was injured by the full amount of the illegal over­
charge. 54 The Court was unwilling to complicate section 4 actions 
by tracing the effects of overcharges on prices, costs, sales, and 
profits. 55 Second, if antitrust violators were allowed to defend with 
the argument that overcharges were passed on to others in the 
chain of distribution, section 4 actions would devolve on consumers 
with minuscule damages and little interest in bringing suit. De­
fendants would, therefore, potentially be able to keep the fruits of 
their illegal actions. 56. 
The Illinois Brick Court was trapped by the Hanover Shoe de­
cision. The. Justices saw their options as either overruling Hanover 
Shoe or applying the decision to both plaintiffs and defendants 
equally. 57 In deciding upon the latter course, they also adopted the 
Hanover Shoe reasoning that to do otherwise would overly compli­
cate section 4 actions with convoluted theories of proof. 58 The Il­
linois Brick Court also reasoned that if indirect purchasers were 
allowed to establish their .cases by attempts to prove that illegal 
overcharges had been passed on to them by direct purchasers, de­
fendants would be exposed to multiple liability. 59 This would result 
since under Hanover Shoe the direct purchaser had standing to sue 
for treble damages as well. 
Although Illinois Brick was decided before the Reiter appeal 
arrived before the Supreme Court, the direct purchaser rule, 
51. Id. at 484. 
52. Id. at 487-88. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 489. 
55. Id. at 492-93. 
56. Id. at 494. 
57. 431 U.S. at 729. 
58. Id. at 737. 
59. Id. 
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which would have denied Reiter standing, was not raised since the 
issue had not been addressed by the lower courts. 60 Any decision 
promulgated with regard to the business or property language of 
section 4 would therefore be subject to the direct purchaser rule of 
Illinois Brick. 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In ruling on Sonotone's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, 
the Supreme Court had to resolve the question of whether Reiter's 
injury, that of paying a higher price for goods due to antitrust vio­
lations, was an injury to business or property.61 The Court first 
found that canons of statutory construction mandated an interpreta­
tion of "business or property" that would give effect to the disjunc­
tive "or. "62 Since the Clayton Act had been held to be comprehen­
sive in its terms and coverage,63 the Court gave "property" its 
naturally broad and inclusive meaning64 and held that paying an il­
legally high price was an injury to property. 65 
The Court also relied on two cases to support its decision. 66 
The first, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta,67 held 
that an injury to property included the injury incurred by a city 
when it was led to pay higher prices in the marketplace for pipes 
used in its waterworks. 68 lhe Chattanooga Foundry Court rea­
soned that if the term "business or property" were restricted to 
commercial interests, the word "property" would become meaning­
less since business and commerce are identical. 69 The Reiter Court 
explained Chattanooga Foundry as being based solely on the city's 
position as a consumer in the marketplace. 70 Since the city had re­
course to the courts for redress of the injury it incurred by paying 
60. 442 U.S. at 337 n.3. 
61. Id. at 334. 
62. Id. at 338. 
63. Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); 
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) 
(California sugar refiners' agreement to pay uniform price for sugar beets held to be 
within proscription of Sherman Act since sugar was sold in interstate commerce). 
64. "Property" was defined by the Court as comprehending anything of mate­
rial value. 442 U.S. at 338. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC­
TIONARY 1818 (1976). 
65. 442 U.S. at 342. 
66. Id. at 339-42. 
67. 203 U.S. 390 (1906). 
68. [d. at 396. 
69. Id. at 397. 
70. 442 U.S. at 342. 
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an illegally higher price for its pipes, it followed that Reiter had a 
similar right and that property must be found to include the con­
sumer's interest. 71 
The second case relied on by the Reiter Court, Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co. of California,72 involved alleged conspiracies in 
restraint of trade and attempts to monopolize the distribution of re­
fined petroleum products in Hawaii. 73 The Hawaii Court held that 
Hawaii did not have standing to sue as parens patriae on behalf of 
its citizens for injuries to its general economy.74 In the course of its 
decision, the Court stated that "business or property" referred only 
to commercial interests. or enterprises. 75 The Reiter Court ex­
plained this language by reasoning that "commercial interests" was 
used only as a generic reference to the interests of Hawaii as a 
party to a commercial transaction. 76 The Court further explained 
that such a result was mandated by dicta in the case which stated 
that Hawaii would have a cause of action as a consumer in the 
marketplace if an injury was incurred through payment wrongfully 
induced. 77 
The Court concluded with a discussion of the legislative his­
tory of the Clayton Act. The Justices first pointed out that the 
discussions surrounding passage of the Act shed little light on the 
meaning of "business or property. "78 The Court, however, did rec­
ognize that the right of a consumer to bring such an action for 
damages was never questioned. 79 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 80 was also cited for its examination of the legisla­
tive history of the Act. 81 Brunswick found the Clayton Act to be a 
remedy for the people of the United States as individuals82 and, 
71. [d. at 340. 
72. 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
73. Id. at 265. 
74. [d. 
75. Id. at 264. 
76. 442 U.S. at 341-42. 
77. [d. at 342. 
78. [d. at 342 n.4 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 
(1972»; Weinberg v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977) 
(retail purchasers of clothing sold at artificially high prices held not to have suffered 
an injury to "business or property"); I.P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 
(1978); M. FORKOSCH, supra note 29; Note, CLosing the Door on Consumer Antitrust 
Standing, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237 (1979). 
79. 442 U.S. at 343. 
80. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
81. 442 U.S. at 343. 
82. 429 U.S. at 486. See also note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
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therefore, that the Act supported a broad reading of "business or 
property. "83 
Although an expansive reading of "business or property" 
would give standing to a larger group of potential litigants and 
therefore would increase the burden on the federal courts, the 
Court reasoned that this interpretation of the statute must be ac­
cepted. 84 Any increase in demand on judicial resources would be 
met by resources supplied by Congress. 85 The potentially ruinous 
effect on small business that might occur because of the costs asso­
ciated with increased litigation was dismissed as more properly 
within the province of Congress to resolve. 86 
V. ANALYSIS 
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of 
"business or property" broadly to include Reiter's consumer injury, 
absent the overruling of Illinois Brick, Reiter will be defeated on 
remand. This result is mandated since Reiter was an indirect pur­
chaser, having bought from a retailer,87 and therefore falls squarely 
within the direct purchaser rule of Illinois Brick. The remaining 
question is whether such an outcome is consistent with the con­
gressional interpretation of standing for indirect purchasers. 
The congressional interpretation of standing for indirect pur­
chasers is found in the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. 88 The 
Act created no new substantive liability for antitrust violators.89 In­
stead, it created a new procedure whereby state attorneys general 
could sue antitrust violators on behalf of injured citizens. 9o Since 
the Act was only procedural in nature, Congress' view of liability 
under the Act was also its interpretation of liability under section 4 
of the Clayton Act. Some commentators, quoting the Act,91 suggest 
83. 442 U.S. at 344. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. at 344-45. 
87. 435 F. Supp. at 934. 
88. Pub. L. No. 94-435, tit. III, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976) (codified in scattered sec­
tions of 15 U.S.C.). 
89. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2572, 2578. 
90. [d. 
91. S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1976) provided in part: 
A direct cause of action is granted the States to avoid the inequities and 
inconsistencies of restrictive judicial interpretations.... [This Act] is in­
tended to assure that consumers are not precluded from the opportunity of 
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that Congress' view was that the economic burden of most antitrust 
violations was borne by the consumer and that the consumer 
should have a remedy regardless of his ;remoteness from the anti­
trust violator.92 Further support for this position can be found in 
the bills submitted before Congress which would overrule Illinois 
Brick and would grant standing to indirect purchasers. 93 
In passing the Antitrust Improvements Act, however, Con­
gress cited several cases as correctly stating the law in this area. 94 
These cases are reconcilable with Illinois Brick and suggest that 
Congress, like the Supreme Court, would generally deny indirect 
purchasers standing. The In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,95 for 
example, involved suits brought by governmental agencies to re­
cover damages for injuries incurred through purchases of asphalt 
from suppliers who allegedly engaged in price-fixing conspiracies. 96 
Standing was granted although the plaintiffs were indirect purchas­
ers, having purchased the. asphalt as part of road projects com­
pleted by contractors through the bidding process. 97 
The Liquid Asphalt court granted standing for two reasons. 
First, proof of damages would not be an overly complex issue,98 
proving their damage and to avoid problems with respect to manageability 
[of class actions], standing, privity, target area, remoteness, and the like. 
92. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 757 (Brennan, J., dis­
senting); Note, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 230 (1977); 
Note, Antitrust Law-Standing to Sue-Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 46 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 875, 881-82 (1977); Note, Illinois Brick: An Abuse of Precedent to Circumvent 
Congressional Intent, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 501, 517-18. 
93. The initial efforts to overrule Illinois Brick attempted to do so by amending 
§ 4 to read "any person who shall be injured in fact, directly, or indirectly, in his 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may 
sue...." H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1874, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1977) (emphasis added). 
Later efforts ·provided that "[a)ny purchaser or seller ... shall, upon proof of 
payment ... , be deemed injured ... whether or not such purchaser or seller ... 
dealt directly with the defendant." S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). S. 300 did 
provide for a defense based on the passing on of any overcharges to others further 
along the chain of distribution. The availability of such a defense was left to the dis­
cretion of the court. Id. 
94. The Act was patterned "after such innovative decisions as In re Western 
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Master Key Litigation, 
(1973) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 74,680 and (1975) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 60,377 (D. 
Conn.); Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., [1975) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 60,295 (D. Ill.) 
...." S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1976). 
95. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). 
96. Id. at 194. 
97. Id. at 199. 
98. Id. at 195. 
94 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:81 
despite the existence of intervening parties. This result was 
reached because the bid submitted by a contractor contained the 
,supplier's price with an amount added for labor, overhead, and 
profit.99 Damages could be ascertained readily, therefore, from an 
examination of the bid submitted. 
Second, there was little chance of double recovery against the 
suppliers.loo The possibility of double recovery was dismissed be­
cause the contractors would not, in all likelihood, bring suit. Suits 
would not be brought by the contractors since they were controlled 
by the suppliers either directly through stock ownership or indi­
rectly through credit arrangements. The running of the statute of 
limitations and the probability that the contractors had earned a 
percentage profit on the suppliers' overcharges also would serve to 
lessen the chance of suit by the contractors. 101 
A second case, similar in facts to Liquid Asphalt and also cited 
by Congress for its decision on standing, was In re Master Key Lit­
igation .102 This suit involved an alleged price-fixing conspiracy as­
sociated with the distribution of building hardware such as locks, 
latches, and keys.l03 Contractors purchased overpriced building 
hardware from distributors and then resold it as part of finished 
buildings. Although the governmental entities which purchased the 
buildings were one level removed from the distributors who were 
the antitrust violators, the court granted standing. l04 
Like LiqUid Asphalt, the Master Key court offered two reasons 
for its decision. First, damages could be ascertained readily since 
the bids submitted to the plaintiffs were computed solely on a per­
centage mark-up basis.l05 Under this method the profit earned by 
the contractor was a percentage of the total costs incurred. Once 
the percentage mark-up is known, the cost of any supplies can be 
determined. Then, given the cost, damages arising out of the al­
leged price-fixing conspiracy can be traced. 
Secondly, unless the plaintiffs were allowed standing, no suits 
against these suppliers could be brought. 106 The court recognized 
that since the bids were based on a percentage mark-up, the con­
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 198. 
101. Id. 
102. [1973] TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 74,680 at 94,977 (D. Conn.). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 94,981. 
106. Id. at 94,978. 
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tractors suffered no harm because their profit margins were main­
tained. Also, the court stated that the statute of limitations barred 
suit by many of the contractors. The court recognized that for 
these same reasons the fear of double recoveries against the de­
fendants was hypothetical. 107 
The third case cited by Congress, but in which standing was 
denied, was Illinois v. Ampress Brick CO.108 This case is particu­
larly important since on appeal to the Supreme Court, under the 
name of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,109 it was used by the Court 
to advance the direct purchaser rule. The Illinois Brick plaintiffs, 
the State of Illinois and 700 other governmental entities, were indi­
rect purchasers. 110 The state purchased cement blocks in the form 
of buildings from its contractors. The contractors had in tum 
bought the blocks from manufacturers for an illegally higher price. 
The Ampress Brick court held that indirect purchasers of altered 
goods did not have standing to sue. 111 The cement blocks were al­
tered since they had been included with other construction materi­
als in the completed buildings. 112 Since altered goods were also in­
volved in Master Key, yet standing was granted,113 a closer ex­
amination of the facts underlying the decision is necessary. 
Critical to the court's decision was proof that only seven per­
cent of the 700 plaintiffs were able to state the cost of the cement 
blocks included in the buildings they bought. 114 None of the plain­
tiffs alleged that the contracts were computed on the cost-plus or 
percentage mark-up basis. l1s Of the 700 plaintiffs, only one offered 
evidence as to the price of the blocks. That price was less than one­
half of the percent of the total bid submitted. 116 The court was un­
doubtedly affected by the uncertainty and complexity that would 
have attended any proof of damages. Such reasoning would bring 
Ampress Brick in line with the reasoning found in Master Key and 
Liquid Asphalt. In the latter cases since the existence of cost-plus 
or percentage mark-up contracts made damages readily ascertain­
107. [d. 
108. 67 F.RD. 461 (D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163 (7th CiL), rev'd sub 
nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 431 U.S. at 720. 
109. See notes 47-59 supra and accompanying text. 





ll2. Id. at 468. 

ll3. See text accompanying notes 102-05 supra. 

ll4. 431 U.S. at 727 n.6. 

ll5. 67 F.RD. at 463. 

ll6. 431 U.S. at 727. 
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able, standing was granted. In the former case, damages were in­
definite and not susceptible to ready proof and standing was 
denied. 
The preceding cases delineate Congress' position on the stand­
ing issue with regard to indirect purchasers. Where damages lend 
themselves to ready proof, because of a cost-plus contract as in 
Liquid Asphalt or a percentage mark-up contract as in Master Key, 
standing should be granted. Where damages are speculative and 
not readily ascertainable because costs cannot be traced through 
contractual agreements, standing should be denied, as it was in 
Ampress Brick. Congress also believes that since standing is a pre­
liminary issue, consideration of the possibility of double recoveries 
against the defendant should not weigh heavily in the standing de­
cision. Furthermore, the statute of limitations may render such a 
possibility moot as in Liquid Asphalt and Master Key. Lastly, Con­
gress recognizes that unless indirect purchasers are granted stand­
ing to sue, many antitrust violations will go unchallenged because 
of the close relationship between violator and intermediary as in 
Liquid Asphalt. It follows that, in addition to the threshold matters 
of establishing an injury and an antitrust violation, Congress would 
require only that damages be easily computed, . preferably through 
contractual agreements. 
The position of the Supreme Court with respect to indirect 
purchasers was given in the appeal of the Ampress Brick case. The 
Court held that only direct purchasers were injured within the 
. meaning of section 4 and . that . indirect purchasers lacked standing 
to sue. 117 Allowing indirect purchasers standing, the Court rea­
soned, would present insurmountable problems of proof, delaying 
litigation and undermining the effectiveness of the private enforce­
ment mechanism. us 
The Court recognized that the difficulties faced by indirect 
purchasers with regard to proof of damages would not always exist. 
In dicta, the Court expressed the opinion that where cost-plus con­
tracts existed, allowing for ready determination of damages, the di­
rect purchaser rule would not apply and indirect purchasers would 
have standing.119 Consequently, where damages are specific and 
readily amenable to proof, the Court presumably would be willing 
to grant standing, as would Congress. 
117. [d. at 736. 
118. Id. See also notes 47-59 supra and accompanying text. 
119. 431 U.S. at 732 n.12. 
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Although the positions of Congress and the Supreme Court 
are reconcilable, they are not in complete agreement. Both posi­
tions would grant standing to indirect purchasers where damages 
are specific and susceptible to ready proof because of contractual 
agreements. The Supreme Court, though, finds that this situation 
exists only where a cost-plus contract is present. 120 Congress' posi­
tion is that a percentage mark-up contract as well as a cost-plus 
contract makes damages readily provable. It should be recognized, 
moreover, that these positions unduly restrict the standing of indi­
rect purchasers. Since consumers usually make purchases through 
intermediaries, not directly from antitrust violators, and without 
the benefit of cost-plus or percentage mark-up contracts, it is upon 
them that this rule impacts. 
The Reiter decision, that consumer injuries are within the 
business or property language of section 4 of the Clayton Act, 121 
will be subject to the direct purchaser rule of Illinois Brick upon 
remand of the case. 122 With Congress and the Supreme Court in 
agreement that indirect purchasers should be denied standing, Rei­
ter's cause of action will be lost. This result shows that the Su­
preme Court granted nothing to the consumer through its ruling in 
Reiter. Anything granted through the broad interpretation of busi­
ness or property is lost through the indirect purchaser rule of Illi­
nois Brick. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Standing was developed by the courts in an attempt to restrict 
the availability of the judicial system to only meritorious claims. As 
applied to section 4 of the Clayton Act, standing was developed to 
avoid the strain on judicial resources resulting from antitrust suits 
involving remote injuries with their negligible, speculative, and 
unascertainable damages. 
The Supreme Court apparently expanded consumer standing 
under section 4 of the Clayton Act in Reiter v. Sonotone COrp.123 
The Court held that a consumer who pays more for goods because 
of antitrust violations is injured within the business or property 
language of section 4. This broad grant of standing, however, is se­
verely limited by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois .124 Illinois Brick held 
120. [d. at 736. 
121. 442 U.S. at 342. 
122. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
123. 442 U.S. at 330. 
124. 431 U.S. at 720. 
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that a direct purchaser alone may be injured within the meaning of 
section 4. Consumers, usually indirect purchasers since they make 
their purchases from intermediary retailers, are foreclosed from the 
section 4 remedy. Until the Illinois Brick case is overruled, the de­
cision in Reiter grants nothing to consumers. With Congress' posi­
tion on standing in line with Illinois Brick, this overruling of Illi­
nois Brick cannot be expected. 
Craig Y. Clark 
